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<title>Journal of Semantics - recent issues</title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org</link>
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<prism:eIssn>1477-4593</prism:eIssn>
<prism:publicationName>Journal of Semantics</prism:publicationName>
<prism:issn>0167-5133</prism:issn>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/4/329?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Decisions, Dynamics and the Japanese Particle yo]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/4/329?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I provide an account of the Japanese sentence-final particle <I>yo</I> within a dynamic semantics framework. I argue that <I>yo</I> is used with one of two intonational morphemes, corresponding to sentence-final rising or falling tunes. These intonational morphemes modify a sentence's illocutionary force head, adding an addressee-directed update semantics to the utterance. The different intonational contours specify whether this update is monotonic or non-monotonic. The use of <I>yo</I> is then argued to contribute a pragmatic presupposition to the utterance saying that the post-update discourse context is one in which the addressee's contextual decision problem is resolved. This proposal is shown to account for a range of constraints on the felicitous use of <I>yo</I>, including its restriction to addressee-new and addressee-relevant information in assertions, as well as its behaviour in imperatives and interrogatives.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davis, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 09 Nov 2009 05:30:03 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp007</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Decisions, Dynamics and the Japanese Particle yo]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>366</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>329</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/4/367?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Branching Quantification v. Two-way Quantification]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/4/367?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>We discuss the thesis formulated by Hintikka (1973) that certain natural language sentences require non-linear quantification to express their meaning. We investigate sentences with combinations of quantifiers similar to Hintikka's examples and propose a novel alternative reading expressible by linear formulae. This interpretation is based on linguistic and logical observations. We report on our experiments showing that people tend to interpret sentences similar to Hintikka sentence in a way consistent with our interpretation.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gierasimczuk, N., Szymanik, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 09 Nov 2009 05:30:03 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp008</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Branching Quantification v. Two-way Quantification]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>392</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>367</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/4/393?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Formal Semantic Analysis of Gesture]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/4/393?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The gestures that speakers use in tandem with speech include not only conventionalized actions with identifiable meanings (so-called <I>narrow gloss gestures</I> or <I>emblems</I>) but also productive iconic and deictic gestures whose form and meanings seem largely improvised in context. In this paper, we bridge the descriptive tradition with formal models of reference and discourse structure so as to articulate an approach to the interpretation of these productive gestures. Our model captures gestures' partial and incomplete meanings as derived from form and accounts for the more specific interpretations they derive in context. Our work emphasizes the commonality of the pragmatic mechanisms for interpreting both language and gesture, and the place of formal methods in discovering the principles and knowledge that those mechanisms rely on.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lascarides, A., Stone, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 09 Nov 2009 05:30:03 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp004</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Formal Semantic Analysis of Gesture]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>449</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>393</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/3/217?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Interpretation of Functional Heads: Using Comparatives to Explore the Mass/Count Distinction]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/3/217?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Comparative judgments for mass and count nouns yield two generalizations. First, all words that can be used in both mass and count syntax (e.g. <I>rock, string, apple, water</I>) always denote individuals when used in count syntax but never when used in mass syntax (e.g. <I>too many rocks</I> v. <I>too much rock</I>). Second, some mass nouns denote individuals (e.g. <I>furniture</I>) while others do not (e.g. <I>water</I>). In this article, we show that no current theory of mass&ndash;count semantics can capture these two facts and argue for an alternative theory that can. We propose that lexical roots are not specified as mass or count. Rather, a root becomes a mass noun or count noun by combining with a functional head. Some roots have denotations with individuals while others do not. The count head is interpreted as a function that maps denotations without individuals to those with individuals. The mass head is interpreted as an identity function making the interpretation of a mass noun equivalent to the interpretation of the root. As a result, all count nouns have individuals in their denotation, whereas mass counterparts of count nouns do not. Also, some roots that have individuals in their denotations can be used as mass nouns to denote individuals.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bale, A. C., Barner, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 05 Aug 2009 13:00:30 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp003</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Interpretation of Functional Heads: Using Comparatives to Explore the Mass/Count Distinction]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>252</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>217</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/3/253?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/3/253?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I provide a novel semantic analysis of proper names and indexicals, combining insights from the competing traditions of referentialism, championed by Kripke and Kaplan, and descriptivism, introduced by Frege and Russell, and more recently resurrected by Geurts and Elbourne, among others. From the referentialist tradition, I borrow the proof that names and indexicals are not synonymous to any definite description but pick their referent from the context directly. From the descriptivist tradition, I take the observation that names, and to some extent indexicals, have uses that are best understood by analogy with anaphora and definite descriptions, that is, following Geurts, in terms of presupposition projection. The hybrid analysis that I propose is couched in Layered Discourse Representation Theory. Proper names and indexicals trigger presuppositions in a dedicated layer, which is semantically interpreted as providing a contextual anchor for the interpretation of the other layers. For the proper resolution of DRSs with layered presuppositions, I add two constraints to van der Sandt's algorithm. The resulting proposal accounts for both the classic philosophical examples and the new linguistic data, preserving a unified account of the preferred rigid interpretation of both names and indexicals, while leaving room for non-referential readings under contextual pressure.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maier, E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 05 Aug 2009 13:00:30 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp006</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>315</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>253</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/3/317?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Counterfactual Donkey Sentences: A Response to Robert van Rooij]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/3/317?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Robert <cross-ref type="bib" refid="bib4">van Rooij (2006)</cross-ref> proposed an analysis of counterfactual donkey sentences by combining the Stalnaker&ndash;Lewis analysis of counterfactuals with standard dynamic semantics. This paper points out some problems with van Rooij's treatment of counterfactual sentences in the language of first-order logic and provides a new interpretation using dynamic semantics.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wang, Y.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 05 Aug 2009 13:00:30 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Counterfactual Donkey Sentences: A Response to Robert van Rooij]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>328</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>317</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/2/109?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Agreement, Disputes and Commitments in Dialogue]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/2/109?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper provides a logically precise analysis of agreement and disputes in dialogue. The semantics distinguishes among the public commitments of each dialogue agent, including commitments to relational speech acts or <I>rhetorical relations</I> (e.g. <I>Narration, Explanation</I> and <I>Correction</I>). Agreement is defined to be the shared entailments of the agents' public commitments. We show that this makes precise predictions about implicit agreement. The theory also provides a consistent interpretation of disputes and models what content is agreed upon when a dispute has taken place.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lascarides, A., Asher, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 05 May 2009 04:02:44 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffn013</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Agreement, Disputes and Commitments in Dialogue]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>158</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>109</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/2/159?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Multiple Focus]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/2/159?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper presents the results of an experimental study on multiple focus configurations, that is, structures containing two nested focus-sensitive operators plus two foci supposed to associate with those operators. There has been controversial discussion in the semantic literature regarding whether or not an interpretation is acceptable that corresponds to this association. While the data are unclear, the issue is of considerable theoretical significance, as it distinguishes between the available theories of focus interpretation. Some theories (e.g. Rooth's 1992) predict such a pattern of association with focus to be impossible, while others (such as Wold&rsquo;s 1996) predict it to be acceptable. The results of our study show the data to be unacceptable rather than acceptable, favouring important aspects of the theory of focus interpretation developed by Rooth.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Beck, S., Vasishth, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 05 May 2009 04:02:44 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp001</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Multiple Focus]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>184</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>159</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/2/185?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Solving Learnability Problems in the Acquisition of Semantics]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/26/2/185?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This paper proposes solutions to two semantic learnability problems that have featured prominently in the literature on language acquisition. Both problems have often been deemed unsolvable for language learners as a matter of logic, and they have accordingly been taken to motivate principles making sure they will not actually arise in the course of language acquisition. One problem concerns the acquisition of ambiguous sentences whose readings are related by entailment. Crain <I>et al.</I>'s (1994) <I>Semantic Subset Principle</I> is intended to preempt the problem by preventing acquisition of the weaker reading before the stronger reading has been acquired. In contrast, we demonstrate that this very order of acquisition becomes feasible in principle if children can exploit non-truth-conditional evidence of various kinds or evidence from sentences containing downward entailing operators. The other learnability problem concerns the potential need for expunction of certain readings of ambiguous sentences from a child's grammar. It has often been assumed that, in the absence of negative evidence, such expunction is impossible, and Wexler and Manzini (1987) posit a <I>Subset Principle</I> to preempt the problematic learning scenario. We argue, however, that if the evidence available to the child includes dialogues, and if listeners are expected to interpret speakers' utterances <I>charitably</I>, then expunction of unavailable readings is possible in principle.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gualmini, A., Schwarz, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 05 May 2009 04:02:44 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp002</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Solving Learnability Problems in the Acquisition of Semantics]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>215</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>185</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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