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<title>Journal of Semantics - Advance Access</title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org</link>
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<prism:eIssn>1477-4593</prism:eIssn>
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<title><![CDATA[Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/ffp006v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>I provide a novel semantic analysis of proper names and indexicals, combining insights from the competing traditions of referentialism, championed by Kripke and Kaplan, and descriptivism, introduced by Frege and Russell, and more recently resurrected by Geurts and Elbourne, among others. From the referentialist tradition, I borrow the proof that names and indexicals are not synonymous to any definite description but pick their referent from the context directly. From the descriptivist tradition, I take the observation that names, and to some extent indexicals, have uses that are best understood by analogy with anaphora and definite descriptions, that is, following Geurts, in terms of presupposition projection. The hybrid analysis that I propose is couched in Layered Discourse Representation Theory. Proper names and indexicals trigger presuppositions in a dedicated layer, which is semantically interpreted as providing a contextual anchor for the interpretation of the other layers. For the proper resolution of DRSs with layered presuppositions, I add two constraints to van der Sandt's algorithm. The resulting proposal accounts for both the classic philosophical examples and the new linguistic data, preserving a unified account of the preferred rigid interpretation of both names and indexicals, while leaving room for non-referential readings under contextual pressure.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maier, E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp006</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-11</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/ffp005v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Counterfactual Donkey Sentences: A Response to Robert van Rooij]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/ffp005v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Robert van Rooij (2006) proposed an analysis of counterfactual donkey sentences by combining the Stalnaker&ndash;Lewis analysis of counterfactuals with standard dynamic semantics. This paper points out some problems with van Rooij's treatment of counterfactual sentences in the language of first-order logic and provides a new interpretation using dynamic semantics.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wang, Y.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-06-02</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Counterfactual Donkey Sentences: A Response to Robert van Rooij]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-06-02</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/ffp004v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[A Formal Semantic Analysis of Gesture]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/ffp004v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The gestures that speakers use in tandem with speech include not only conventionalized actions with identifiable meanings (so-called <I>narrow gloss gestures</I> or <I>emblems</I>) but also productive iconic and deictic gestures whose form and meanings seem largely improvised in context. In this paper, we bridge the descriptive tradition with formal models of reference and discourse structure so as to articulate an approach to the interpretation of these productive gestures. Our model captures gestures' partial and incomplete meanings as derived from form and accounts for the more specific interpretations they derive in context. Our work emphasizes the commonality of the pragmatic mechanisms for interpreting both language and gesture, and the place of formal methods in discovering the principles and knowledge that those mechanisms rely on.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lascarides, A., Stone, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-05-04</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp004</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Formal Semantic Analysis of Gesture]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-04</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/ffp003v1?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Interpretation of Functional Heads: Using Comparatives to Explore the Mass/Count Distinction]]></title>
<link>http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/ffp003v1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Comparative judgments for mass and count nouns yield two generalizations. First, all words that can be used in both mass and count syntax (e.g. <I>rock, string, apple, water</I>) always denote individuals when used in count syntax but never when used in mass syntax (e.g. <I>too many rocks</I> v. <I>too much rock</I>). Second, some mass nouns denote individuals (e.g. <I>furniture</I>) while others do not (e.g. <I>water</I>). In this article, we show that no current theory of mass&ndash;count semantics can capture these two facts and argue for an alternative theory that can. We propose that lexical roots are not specified as mass or count. Rather, a root becomes a mass noun or count noun by combining with a functional head. Some roots have denotations with individuals while others do not. The count head is interpreted as a function that maps denotations without individuals to those with individuals. The mass head is interpreted as an identity function making the interpretation of a mass noun equivalent to the interpretation of the root. As a result, all count nouns have individuals in their denotation, whereas mass counterparts of count nouns do not. Also, some roots that have individuals in their denotations can be used as mass nouns to denote individuals.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bale, A. C., Barner, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2009-04-01</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/jos/ffp003</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Interpretation of Functional Heads: Using Comparatives to Explore the Mass/Count Distinction]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-04-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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