Journal of Semantics Advance Access originally published online on November 2, 2005
Journal of Semantics 2006 23(2):107-134; doi:10.1093/jos/ffh034
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Truth and Reference in Context
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano
Correspondence: ANDREA BONOMI, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi Milano, Via Festa del Perdono, 7, 20122 Milano, Italia, e-mail: andrea.bonomi{at}unimi.it
In communicative exchanges one of the most familiar phenomena is accommodation, which enables the addressee to incorporate a missing piece of information into her own view of the common ground. A less familiar, but equally important, phenomenon is what I call discommodation, whose main feature consists in the fact that the missing piece of information, although essential to the comprehension of the utterance, cannot be shared by the addressee because it sounds problematic or even false to her. In such cases it is possible to open a presuppositional slot to take into account the assumptions that serve to select the reference of the noun phrase, but that are not incorporated into the revised context. One of the main purposes of the paper is to propose a definition of truth (with respect to a presuppositional apparatus) that does not ignore the role of discommodation when different views of the common ground are involved.1