Journal of Semantics Advance Access originally published online on June 20, 2005
Journal of Semantics 2005 22(3):307-337; doi:10.1093/jos/ffh021
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders
Universiteit van Tilburg
By force of causes precede effects, causality contributes to the temporal meaning of discourse. In case of semantic causal relations, this contribution is straightforward, but in case of epistemic causal relations, it is not. In order to gain insight into the semantics of epistemic causal relations, paradoxical cases are analyzed of text fragments in which temporal and causal meaning seem to be irreconcilable. A solution is proposed consisting of several parts: First, an analysis of epistemic causal coherence relations, in which the effect sentence is argued to be a (covert) belief sentence. Secondly, a method for deriving (epistemic) causal coherence relations. And thirdly, a format for representing temporal meaning in which contributions of tense and causality can be reconciled. Finally, it is argued that understanding epistemically causally connected sequences (or: argumentation) is not equal to being persuaded to believing them. The difference is shown to be expressible in the representation format proposed.
1 Ever since Vendler (1957), classifications of types of events have been proposed, e.g. by Bach (1986) and Moens & Steedman (1988). In this paper, the basic distinction between states and events is respected but more refined distinctions are left aside.
2 This default, a consequence of the anaphoric property of tense, can be overruled by several (context-)factors as in: (The party went on all night.) But John had left early because his ex-girlfriend showed up (anonymous reviewer). The complex nature of the pluperfect is the main topic of Oversteegen & Bekker (2002).
3 If one wants to allow for causal relations between eventualities starting simultaneously, the relation between the initial points of the corresponding intervals should be 
instead of <.
4 The definition of explanation given by Lascarides & Asher (1993) is: 
, 
, ß
cause(me(ß), me()) > Explanation (,ß) where me() stands for ‘main eventuality described in ’.
5 Knott & Mellish (1996) attempt to understand what happens with regard to causal relations in argumentation as well. However, they understand the epistemic causal relation as being symmetrical. See Knott and Mellish, 1996: 154 (15):
- (15) The footprints are deep. It follows that/so the thief was a heavy man.
6 Something similar holds for the future. However, the future is not solely a temporal category and I will return to it in the section on modality (4.1).
7 For definitions of temporal categories in this TTS model, I refer to Oversteegen 1986, 1989, 1993, and Oversteegen & Bekker 2002.
8 At least, this is the way in which assertions are treated. This treatment conforms to Stalnaker's treatment of assertive propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values.
9 In the remaining part of the paper, I will refer to the complete conditional (AX 
Y 
P) as the INUS scheme. I will systematically neglect the disjunct Y: it is of no importance here to find the ‘entire’ set of causes in the causal relations (cf. Mackie 1965).
10 Therefore, the relation between A and P in (12b) should be represented by the symbol > for defeasible implication (Lascarides & Asher, 1991, 1993, and Lascarides & Oberlander, 1993). The symbol indicates that the conditional relation functions in a non-monotonous logic (Asher & Morreau 1991). Henceforth, this symbol will be used.
11 In argumentation theory we find a concept strikingly similar to the INUS scheme. Gerritsen & Snoeck Henkemans (1990), working within the framework of Pragma-dialectic argumentation theory developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1982), describe a procedure for the reconstruction of the intended link between arguments and claims, as the pragmatic optimum. Both the INUS scheme and the pragmatic optimum have the form of a conditional, and both have to be reconstructed from two causally connected text parts amplified with textual and situational context information.
12 This difference is due to the ‘indivisibility’ of events, as it has often been called in the aspectual literature. Consequently, in case of an event causing a state, I will assume that the event entirely precedes the state. However, assuming that only the start of the event precedes the start of the state, and, consequently, allowing the event and the state to overlap, would not change the analysis presented in the paper in any significant way.
13 An epistemic causal does not necessarily reflect a reasoning from result to cause. An epistemic-causally connected sequence of sentences like: There must be puddles on the streets. It has been raining for hours, expresses a reasoning from a cause to an (uncertain) result (cf. Noordman & De Blijzer 2000).
14 Introducing a separate realm for representing attitudinal or perspectivized meaning has been proposed in other frameworks as well, for example, in DRT as ‘articulated DRSs’ (Kamp 1990), in SDRT (Asher, 1993), and in Mental Space theory (Fauconnier, 1994; Fauconnier & Sweetser, 1996).
15 Temporal information in causal coherence relations is implicit. Freksa & Barkowski (1999) argue that a spatial representation, which a TTS is, is especially suitable when: 1. The knowledge to be represented consists of a large number of interrelated relations and many of these relations can be captured simultaneously by the arrangement of a comparatively small number of objects (p. 202); 2. Implicit knowledge is represented (p. 205); and 3. It is not necessary to make all the knowledge represented explicit: inferences can be made (p. 205).
16 The relation between Be1 and e1 remains the same.
17 The rule CCT, presented here as (3) in section 1, tells us that the second clause of (6) must function as an explanation for the first clause. Being crazy when she bought the piano would be presented as an explanation for her creating the undesirable situation in the room described in the first clause.
18 Asher & Lascarides (1998) argue that ‘Full understanding takes the full [discourse representation] structure and integrates it with the beliefs of the interpreter, and as such comes after discourse interpretation’ (Asher & Lascaridis 1998: 85). In fact, this order is suggested by the analysis presented in this paper as well.