Journal of Semantics Advance Access originally published online on August 28, 2008
Journal of Semantics 2009 26(1):1-48; doi:10.1093/jos/ffn005
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No Alternative to Alternatives
Ben-Gurion University
Correspondence: ARIEL COHEN, Department of Foreign Literatures and Linguistics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel, e-mail: arikc{at}bgumail.bgu.ac.il
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Abstract |
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Rooth's (1985, 1992) theory of focus requires, in addition to the ordinary semantic value of an expression, the focus semantic value, which is a set of alternatives generated by focus. Rooth claims that the union (disjunction) of the focus semantic value is accommodated into the restrictor of an adverbial quantifier. More recently, however, some researchers (Krifka 2001; Geurts & van der Sandt 2004) have argued convincingly that what is accommodated is, in fact, the existential presupposition induced by focus. It would appear, then, that there is no need for assuming the focus semantic value. However, in this paper, I argue that, although the primary effect of focus is, indeed, presuppositional, the focus semantic value cannot be dispensed with. Not only is the focus semantic value necessary but, in fact, additional semantic values are required too. Unlike focus, the analyses of these other semantic values cannot be reduced simply to existential presupposition. I will concentrate on a special reading of some quantificational sentences, the relative reading, whose adequate account, I propose, requires the use of semantic values triggered by alternatives to various elements: the focus, background marking and the world of evaluation.
‘Only if there are alternatives can one hope to get insight into what is truly at stake.’ Peter F. Drucker, The Effective Executive (p. 147)
Received for publication 4 August 2006. Revision received 10 December 2007. Accepted for publication 12 April 2008.