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Journal of Semantics Advance Access originally published online on February 28, 2008
Journal of Semantics 2008 25(2):141-173; doi:10.1093/jos/ffm017
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

An Epistemic Step for Anti-Presuppositions

Emmanuel Chemla

Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique

Correspondence: EMMANUEL CHEMLA, Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 29 rue d'Ulm, 75230 Paris Cedex 5, France, e-mail: chemla{at}ens.fr


  Abstract

Sentence (1) strongly suggests that the speaker does not have a sister:
(1) John believes that I have a sister.
a. Alternative: John knows that I have a sister.
b. Actual inference: The speaker does not have a sister.
c. Predicted inference: It is not common belief that the speaker has a sister.

According to Heim (1991), Percus (2006), and Sauerland (2006), this inference should follow from the comparison of (1) to (1a). However, such an analysis would only predict a very weak implicature: it is not common belief that the speaker has a sister. I propose to strengthen this prediction by two means. First, I rely on a precise understanding of the modern Stalnakerian view of presuppositions and common ground (Stalnaker 1998, 2002; von Fintel 2000; Schlenker 2006). Second, I argue that this inference depends on contextual factors. More precisely, I show that the Competence Assumption (see Spector 2003; van Rooij & Schulz 2004; Sauerland 2004) necessary to obtain secondary scalar implicatures should be supplemented with an Authority Assumption. I motivate this additional assumption on independent empirical grounds. Finally, I show how my proposal accounts for a wide variety of inferences with fine variations governed by (i) contextual differences and (ii) specific properties of the presupposition triggers involved.

Received for publication 9 January 2007. Revision received 18 June 2007. Accepted for publication 16 August 2007.


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